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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM OF SPEECH -
PRIOR RESTRAINT - The Supreme Court of the United States held
that an injunction providing for a "fixed buffer zone" around an
abortion clinic and a cease and desist provision are valid, however,
a "floating buffer zone" surrounding clinic patients violates the
protesters' First Amendment right of free speech.
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 117 S. Ct 855
(1997).
During the summer of 1990, Project Rescue of Western New
York, Operation Rescue, Project Life of Rochester, and various
individuals, including the plaintiffs, the Reverends Paul Schenck
and Dwight Saunders (collectively "Project Rescue"), engaged in
various activities intended to impede access to abortion clinics in
the Rochester and Buffalo, New York areas and spread the groups'
pro-life message.' Project Rescue used three methods to dissuade
patients from entering clinics and seeking pregnancy-related
services. First, Project Rescue blockaded access to the clinics.
Second, by congregating at various clinics, Project Rescue
constructively blockaded access to the clinics and attempted to
deter patients from seeking abortions using both benign and
aggressive methods.2 Third, Project Rescue employed "sidewalk
counselors" who approached women seeking entry to a clinic and
attempted to discourage the women from terminating their
pregnancies.
3
Attempts by local police to manage the protesters' activities were
1. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 117 S. Ct. 855, 859 (1997)
('Schenck'). The original defendants included Project Rescue of Western New York,
Operation Rescue, Project Life of Rochester, and fifty named individuals, including
petitioners Paul Schenck ("Schenck") and Dwight Saunders ("Saunders). Of the original
defendants, only Schenck and Saunders were parties to this appeal. Id.
2. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue of Western New York,
799 F Supp. 1417 (WD.N.Y. 1992), modified, 67 F3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994), modiJfed, 67 F3d 377
(2d Cir. 1995) (en banc), offd in part and rev'd in part, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997) ("Pro-Choice
F). *Constructive blockade" activities included picketing, chanting, singing, and prayer, as
well as aggressive "in your face" tactics such as screaming epithets, shoving and surrounding
patients and staff, and harassing and intimidating anyone seeking entrance to the clinics. ld,
3. Id, at 1424-25. Project Rescue "sidewalk counselors" stationed themselves outside
clinics repeatedly. Id These protesters attempted to force anti-abortion literature on clinic
patients and to dissuade such patients from obtaining clinic services. Id, Frequently, activists
resorted to strident verbal harassment, often resulting in heated, and occasionally violent
confrontations between the counselors and patient escorts. Id.
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largely ineffective. 4 The local police lacked the necessary resources
to control the large-scale and continuing nature of the protests.5
Additionally, Project Rescue kept planned blockade locations secret
until demonstrations actually began, making effective police
response difficult.6 Finally, protesters attempted to intimidate the
police force by harassing officers and other individuals who
testified in criminal proceedings against the activists.
7
The activities of the abortion protesters adversely affected many
clinic patients.8 Stress caused by having to "run the gauntlet" of
protesters increased the risks associated with the abortion.9
Demonstrations often caused women to have to reschedule
appointments, or to even forgo the procedure entirely.10 In addition,
many women traveled considerable distances, particularly from
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Canada, to obtain pregnancy-related
services at New York facilities, but ultimately were unable or
unwilling to enter the clinics due to the demonstrators' activities.
In an attempt to maintain access to abortion clinics in Western
New York, the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, four
clinics and four physicians ("Pro-Choice") filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of New York on
September 24, 1990.12 The complaint included one federal 13 and six
state14 causes of action.15 Pro-Choice sought permanent injunctive
4. Id. at 1426.
5. Id. Often when police responded, the protesters dispersed, merely reconvening
after police left. Id.
6. IL
7. Pro-Choice I, 799 F Supp. at 1426-27. In addition to the police, other individuals
tesiyng in local criminal court proceedings had been subjected to verbal threWs and had
received threatening letters. Id.
8. I& at 1427.
9. Id. Such stress caused increased blood pressure, hyperventilation, and severe
anxiety occasionally requiring sedation - symptoms that increased abortion-related risks. Id
Consequently, many women required additional counseling before consenting to the
procedure. Id.
10. Id. Delays in obtaining the procedure caused some women to have second
trimester abortions as opposed to first trimester abortions, thus, substantially increasing the
inherent risk of the procedure. Id,
11. Id
12. Pn-Choice I, 799 F Supp. 1417. The plaintiffs were Buffalo Gyn Womenservices,
PC., Erie Medical Center, Paul J. Davis, M.D., P.C., Shalom Press, M.D., Barnett Slepian,
M.D., Morris Wortman, M.D., Highland Obstretical Group, and Alexander Women's Group. Id
13. Id. at 1422. The federal claim alleged a conspiracy to deny women seelding clinic
related services equal protection and equal privileges and immunities under the law. 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
14. Pro-Choice I, 799 F Supp. at 1422. The state claims included violations of New
York Civil Rights Law § 40-c ('No person shall, because of... marital status or disability,
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relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages.16 Additionally,
Pro-Choice moved for a temporary restraining order ("TRO")
enjoining Project Rescue from conducting a blockade planned for
September 28, 1990.17 After conducting a hearing on September 26,
the court issued a TRO the next day.18 The defendants complied
with the TRO, 19 but at a later hearing, moved to dismiss the
complaint.2° Subsequently, various individual defendants allegedly
violated the order.
21
On February 14, 1992, Judge Arcara of the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York issued a preliminary
injunction 22 against Project Rescue.23 Judge Arcara first reviewed
the applicable standards necessary for issuing an injunction.24 He
noted that a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction must be
content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for
be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights, or to any harassment.., in exercise
thereof, by any other person.") and New York Executive Law section 296 (unlawful
discriminatory practices). Additional state claims included. (1) tortious interference with
business; (2) trespass; (3) intentional infliction of emotional harm; (4) tortious harassment;
and (5) false imprisonment Id, The district court elected to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990). Id.
15. Pro-Choice I, 799 E Supp. at 1422.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id, A temporary restraining order may be granted if it "clearly appears from
specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's
attorney can be heard in opposition...." MED. R Civ. P. 65(b).
19. Pno-Choice I, 799 E Supp. at 1422. Defendants, instead, held a peaceful rally as
opposed to the planned blockade. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1423. In response to alleged violations of the TRO, Pro-Choice filed motions
for civil contempt against Bonnie Behn, Carla Rainero, Nancy Walker, Robert Schenck and
Paul Schenck It
22. Id. at 1428. A preliminary injunction may be granted upon a showing that (1) the
movant will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, and (2) either the
movant is likely to succeed on the merits or there is sufficient question as to success on the
merits that "make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly in the movant's favor." Id, (citing Tacker Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888
E2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Kay, 860 F2d 529, 540 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson Dairy,
Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F2d 70,72 (2d Cir. 1979)). Id
23. Id. The court determined that the irreparable harm requirement is satisfied when
(1) deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights cannot be restored by an award of money
damages; (2) there is sufficient evidence of increased risk during the termination procedure
that may lead to unnecessary complications; and (3) there is sufficient likelihood of success
on the plaintiffs' section 1985(3) claim to satisfy the second requirement for granting a
preliminary injunction. Id.
24. Pro-Choice 1, 799 F Supp. at 1432.
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communicating the information.25 Since the proposed injunction
restricted only the location26 and nature of the speech, it satisfied
the content neutral requirement.27 Additionally, Judge Arcara
reasoned that because the restrictions were intended to maintain
access to the clinic, and in fact, had not foreclosed communication,
the restrictions were narrowly tailored 2s to serve a significant
government interest.2 Finally, Judge Arcara determined that the
25. Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)).
26. Id. at 1440. The injunction proscribed the following conduct:
(1)(a) trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding, or obstructing access to, ingress
into or egress from any facility, including, but not limited to, the parking lots, parking
lot entrances, driveways, and driveway entrances at which abortions are performed in
the Western District of New York;
(1)(b) demonstrating within fifteen feet from either side or edge of, or in front of,
doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway
entrances of such facilities, or within fifteen feet of any person seeldng access to or
leaving such facilities, except that the form of demonstrating known as sidewalk
counseling by no more than two persons as specified in paragraph (c) shall be
allowed...
Id.
27. Id. at 1440-41. The irunction further prohibited.
(a) physically abusing, grabbing, touching, pushing, shoving, or crowding persons
entering or leaving, working at or using any services at any facility at which abortions
are performed; provided, however, that sidewalk counseling consisting of a
conversation of a non-threatening nature by not more than two people with each
person or group of persons they are seeking to counsel shall not be prohibited. Also
provided that no one is required to accept or listen to sidewalk counseling, and that if
anyone or any group of persons who is sought to be counseled wants to not have
counseling, wants to leave, or walk away, they shall have the absolute right to do that,
and in such event all persons seelng to counsel that person or group of persons shall
cease and desist from such counseling, and shall thereafter be governed by the
provisions of paragraph (b) pertaining to not demonstrating within fifteen feet of
persons seeking access to or leaving a facility. In addition, it is further provided that
this right to sidewalk counseling as defined herein shall not limit the right of the
Police Department to maintain public order or such reasonably necessary rules and
regulations as they decide are necessary at each particular demonstration site;
(b) using any mechanical loudspeaker or sound amplification device or making any
excessively loud sound which injures, disturbs, or endangers the health or safety of
any patient or employee of a health care facility at which abortions are performed,
nor shall any person make such sounds which interfere with the right of anyone not
in violation of this Order,
(c) attempting, or inducing, directing, aiding, or abetting in any manner, others to
take any of the actions described in paragraphs (a) through (d) above....
Id.
28. Pro-Choice I, 799 F Supp. at 1433-37. The provisions were designed to maintain
access to the clinic while allowing protesters to communicate their message through
traditional means, as well as through the use of a maximum of two sidewalk counselors. Id.
29. Id. at 1433. Government interests included. (1) insuring abortions were performed
safely;, (2) insuring public safety by prohibiting protesters from blocking traffic; (3)
preserving the right to interstate travel; and (4) insuring that the constitutional rights of one
group are not sacrificed in the interest of protecting the rights of a competing group. Id.
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injunction provided alternative means of communication. 3° Thus,
the court found that the injunction fully satisfied the requirements
of the First Amendment.31
Eleven months after the district court issued the preliminary
injunction, the United States Supreme Court decided Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,32 a case factually similar to
Pro-Choice. In Bray, the Supreme Court had just previously held
that the health care providers' complaint in that case failed to state
a claim upon which relief would be granted under 42 U.S.C. section
1985(3), rendering Pro-Choice's federal claim potentially moot.33
Project Rescue moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the remaining state
causes of action, and requested that the injunction be vacated.34
Judge Arcara, noting that Bray did not absolutely foreclose section
1985(3) claims,m found significant federal interests remained at
stake, and thus, denied the defendant's motion.36
Schenck and Saunders, two of the defendants, appealed the
district court's order granting the preliminary injunction to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 37 After oral
argument, but before the appellate court rendered its decision, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Madsen v. Women's
Health Center. This decision announced a new test for evaluating
30. Id. at 1437. The fifteen-foot "clear zone" afforded the protesters ample opportunity
to communicate their message. Even though the sidewalk counselors were required to "cease
and desist" upon the request of the patients, they were allowed to continue to communicate
their message from outside the fifteen-foot buffer zone. Id.
31. Pro-Choice 1, 799 F Supp. at 1440. The First Amendment provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof- or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONSr. amend. L
32. 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (holding that the desire to prevent or discourage abortions is
not discrimination against the "class" of women within the meaning of section 1985(3)).
33. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue of Western New York
(-Pro-Choice IF), 828 F Supp. 1018 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), affid, 67 F3d 359 (3d Cir. 1994).
"Generally, an action is considered 'moot' when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because issues involved have become academic or dead." Sigma Chi Fraternity v.
Regents of University of Colorado, 258 F Supp. 515, 523 (D. Colo. 1966).
34. Pro-Choice II, 828 F Supp. at 1020.
35. I& at 1024.
36. Id. at 1031-32.
37. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck ("Pro-Choice HI"), 67 F3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994),
modified, 67 F3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en banc), aqfd in part and rev'd in part, 117 S. Ct 855
(1997).
38. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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content neutral injunctions.3 Specifically, the Court articulated that
a court must ask "whether the challenged provisions of the
injunction burden no more speech than is necessary to serve a
significant government interest" 4° In light of this new test, the
Second Circuit allowed the parties to submit briefs addressing its
effect.
41
Under the Madsen test, the appellate court had to determine
whether the government's interests in granting the injunction were,
in fact, significant. 42 The Second Circuit agreed that the interests
identified by the district court (insuring the safe performance of
abortions; insuring public safety on roads providing ingress and
egress from clinics; and insuring the preservation of constitutional
rights) were significant.43 The court then examined each of the
challenged provisions of the injunction.44
The Court first considered whether the fifteen-foot "bubble zone"
created pursuant to section 1(b) of the injunction was valid.45 The
court found this feature of the injunction to be unreasonable
because, regardless of whether or not Project Rescue's activity
actually impeded access to the clinic, the activists would be
precluded from conveying their message from public sidewalks, a
location likely to be within fifteen feet of a clinic entrance. 46 Since
this bubble zone substantially restricted the activities of the
demonstrators, it burdened more speech than was necessary, and
thus, failed to meet the requirements of Madsen.47 Therefore, the
court held the "bubble zone" to be invalid.48
39. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-65. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that fundamental
differences exist between an injunction and a generally applicable ordinance. Id. An
ordinance is a product of the political process, whereas an injunction is imposed by judicial
decree. Id. Thus, there is a greater risk of "censorship and discriminatory application"
inherent in an injunction. Id. This difference, the Court believed, demanded a more stringent
test for a content neutral injunction to pass constitutional muster. Id.
40. Id.
41. Pro-Choice III, 67 E3d at 366.
42. Id. at 369.
43. Id See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
44. Id. at 370.
45. Id. The term "bubble zone" was first used here by the appellate court. Id. It refers
to the provision in the injunction that requires protesters to remain at least fifteen feet away
from "persons seeling access to or leaving from such facilities" Id. This feature, allowing
the zone to move, appears to give the court some cause for concern. Id.
46. Pro-Choice I, 67 F3d at 370.
47. Id. at 370-71.
48. Id. Although the Supreme Court upheld a larger thirty-six-foot buffer zone
requirement in Madsen, it did so based on the failure of earlier less restrictive injunctions.
The record here indicated that Project Rescue made a substantial effort to comply with the
Vol. 36:229
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The Court then addressed the validity of the injunction provision
requiring sidewalk counselors to cease and desist upon the request
of the person they sought to counsel. 49 The court believed that this
provision gave patients an unreasonable power over the
demonstrators' ability to communicate their anti-abortion
message.50 Thus, the court found this part of the injunction to be
invalid because it burdened more speech than was necessary.51
Finally, the Court considered the validity of the injunction
provisions that required protesters to refrain from assisting or
compelling others to participate in prohibited actions and Project
Rescue to make a good faith effort to provide its protesters with
sufficient training to enable them to comply with the injunction.2
The court found that these two provisions complied with the
Madsen test, because they burden no more speech than necessary,
as applied to the valid portions of the injunction.3
Judge Oakes dissented from the panel's opinion.54 He stated that
he would have upheld both the bubble zone provision and the
cease and desist provision of the injunction because without these
two provisions, the injunction would be unable to achieve its stated
purpose. Pro-Choice then petitioned the Court of Appeals for a
rehearing en banc.6 The court, sitting en banc,57 addressed whether
TRO. Id.
49. Id. at 371. Part l(c) of the inunction provided, in part: "no one is required to
accept or listen to sidewalk counseling, and that if anyone or any group of persons who is
sought to be counseled wants not to have counseling... they shall have the absolute right
to do that." Id. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50. Id. at 371-72.
51. Pro-Choice III, 67 F3d at 371-72. As long as counselors exercise their First
Amendment rights, patients do not have an absolute right to censor the counselor's message.
Id.
52. Id, at 372. The injunction stated that-
The defendant organizations and their officers and agents, and all individual
defendants and those acting in concert with them, shall make a good faith effort to
instruct all organizations and individuals they believe to be planning to participate in
any of the activities enumerated above not to engage or participate in the activities
enjoined in paragraphs (a) through (e).
Id.
53. Id
54. Id, at 374-77 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
55. Id. Judge Oakes believed greater deference should be given to the trial court Id.
He also stated that the two provisions challenged here were less restrictive than the clear
zone provision in Madsen (which the Supreme Court upheld) and the "no approach"
provision in Madsen (which the Court struck down). Id.
56. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Schenck ("Pro-Choice IT), 67 F3d
377 (2d Cir. 1995), affd in part and revd in part, 117 S. Ct 855 (1997).
57. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide, in part:
When hearing or rehearing en banc will be ordered - A majority of the circuit judges
Duquesne Law Review
the two stricken provisions of the irunction conformed to the
newly announced Madsen test." Judge Oakes, this time writing for
the majority, vacated the panel opinion, and reinstated the two
provisions into the injunction."
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari6° to
determine whether the three provisions of the injunction (the
"floating bubble zone," the fixed buffer zone, and the cease and
desist provision) violated the protesters' First Amendment rights.
61
The Court reviewed its decision in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc.2  Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
acknowledged the factual similarities between Madsen and this
case." The Court also noted that the government interests at stake
in Madsen, held to be significant, were nearly identical to the
interests in this case." Justice Rehnquist noted that, under the new
test, the provisions of' the Madsen injunction relating to a
fixed-distance buffer zone were upheld, while other provisions
relating to a "no approach zone" were struck down.6 The Court
next considered each challenged provision to determine whether it
burdened more speech than necessary.66
The Court first addressed whether the "floating bubble zone"
around vehicles and individuals seeking access to the clinic was
constitutionally permissible.67 Striking down this provision, the
who are in regular active service may order that an appeal or other proceeding be
heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc. Such a hearing or rehearing is not
favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full
court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the
proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
FED. P APP. P. 35(a).
58. Pro-Choice IV, 67 F3d at 386.
59. Id. at393.
60. A "writ of certiorari" is a discretionary order issued by an appellate court to a
lower court, requesting that it certify the record of the proceeding below. BLAcK's LAW
DIaioNARY 1609 (6th ed. 1990). The Supreme Court of the United States grants review based
on a writ of certiorari only when the Court believes compelling reasons exist mandating
review. Id.; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1254, 1257 (1996).
61. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 855.
62. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
63. Schenck, 117 S. Ct at 864-65.
64. Id. at 865-66. The government interests identified in Madsen included. (1)
protection of a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion; (2) preservation of public
peace; and (3) ensuring the health and safety of clinic patients. Id.
65. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct 2516, 2521-22 (1994).
66. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 866-70.
67. Id. at 866-68. This provision, found in 1(b) of the injunction, extends the
fifteen-foot clear zone to "persons seeking access to or leaving such facilities." Id. The Court
uses the term "floating bubble zone" because this zone moves with the person. Id,
236 Vol. 36:229
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Court reasoned that because compliance with the "floating bubble
zone" may be difficult, it created a substantial burden on speech,
and as applied to vehicles, burdened more speech than was
necessary.6 Moreover, the majority believed that this provision,
applicable to patients entering the clinic, was overbroad because it
precluded protesters from handing literature to prospective clinic
patients and made conversation at normal volume difficult.69 Thus,
the Court invalidated the "floating bubble zone."70
The Court then analyzed whether fixed buffer zones were
legitimate exercises of the lower court's power to place prior
restraints on free speech.71 The Court upheld this particular
provision, influenced by the past conduct of the demonstrators that
included several violations of the TRO and interference with the
police.72 Recognizing that the fifteen-foot distance might be
somewhat arbitrary, the Court nevertheless deferred to the district
court's determination that fifteen feet constituted a reasonable
buffer.73
Finally, the Court explored whether the cease and desist
provision of the injunction was an impermissible content-based
restriction of the protesters' First Amendment right to free
speech.74 The Court noted that simply because the injunction was
aimed at abortion protesters did not make it content-based - it
was the prior acts of the protesters, and not their message, upon
which the injunction was granted. 5 The Court reasoned that
delivery of the message is not foreclosed; it must merely be
conveyed from outside the fifteen-foot buffer zone.76 Therefore, the
Court held that the cease and desist provision was valid.7
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas,
68. ld. at 868-69. Protesters would have to constantly insure that they remained
outside the fifteen-foot radius. Id, Additionally, unnecessary litigation might result in de
minimis violations (e.g., approaching within thirteen or fourteen feet). Id, Such a buffer zone
could potentially prevent demonstrators from conveying their message from sidewalks,
streets, and driveways adjacent to clinics. Id,
69. Id at867.
70. 1l at 866-68.
71. Id at 868.
72. Schenck, 117 S. CL at 868-69. The record indicated that activists had blocked
access to clinic entrances on numerous occasions. Id.
73. 1l at 868-69.
74. Id at 870.
75. Id,
76. Schenwk, 117 S. CL at 870.
77. ld, at 870.
1997
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concurred in part, and dissented in part.7 8 The dissent believed that
the Court erred by upholding the fixed buffer zone provision,
finding that the underlying motivation of the injunction was to
prevent protesters from invading the "personal space" of clinic
patients, not to merely protect access to clinics.79 The Justices
further opined that the Court's deferral to the trial court's
determination that establishment of a fixed buffer zone was
reasonable (as the only practical means of maintaining access to
the clinic) was inconsistent with the trial court's actual
conclusion.8° Finally, Justice Scalia reasoned that once the federal
claim had been rendered potentially moot by Bray,81 the district
court lost the power to hear the remaining state claims because
success on the merits of such claims was unlikelym2 Thus, the
dissent found that all three provisions of the injunction were
invalid. .
Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, stating that he would have upheld all three
provisions of the injunction.84 Essentially, Justice Breyer found that
the injunction did not embody the concept of a "floating buffer
zone" and noted that this term did not appear until the Second
Circuit addressed the issue.s5 He stated that any difficulties arising
from a buffer zone's ability to float could be adequately dealt with
by the district court which had a much greater degree of familiarity
with the problems surrounding the issue.8
In order to understand the Court's rationale in Schenck, it is
helpful to examine past Supreme Court cases relating to prior
restraint of an individual's First Amendment right of free speech.87
In 1897, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of prior
78. Id. at 871-75 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 871-72. Justice Scalia noted the trial court's reference to the right of clinic
patients "to be left alone." Id. He stated that these statements contrast with the established
doctrine that there is no constitutionally protected right to be free from offensive speech
(citing Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988)). Id.
80. Id. at 872-73. The real conclusion of the trial court, according to the dissent, was
that the injunction was necessary to protect patients from unwanted speech. Id.
81. See supra note 32.
82. Shenck, 117 S. Ct. at 873-75.
83. Id. at 875.
84. Id. at 875-82 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id, at 878.
86. Id. at 876-79.
87. A "prior restraint" is any attempt by a government to enjoin, restrict, legislate, or
control a person's freedom of speech or expression prior to the actual act of speech or
expression. BLAcKes LAW DICTIONARY 1194 (6th ed. 1990).
Vol. 36:229
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restraint and free speech in Davis v. Massachusetts.80 In Davis, the
Supreme Court considered whether a Boston ordinance, requiring
mayoral pre-approval of public addresses, violated an individual's
First Amendment rights when Davis attempted to make such an
address on the Boston "Commons" without approval of the mayor.89
The Court held that individuals had no constitutionally enforceable
right to use the "Commons" as a forum for advancing their
message.90 Under the Davis rationale, speech in a public forum can
be proscribed entirely by legislation. ' Forty-two years later, a more
modem approach to First Amendment treatment of prior restraints
emerged. 2
In 1939, the Supreme Court decided Hague v. Committee for
Indus. Org..93 In Hague, the Court examined whether an ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of handbills and other similar materials
was void as an infringement on the First Amendment freedom of
speech. 4 A city ordinance in Jersey City, New Jersey required
receipt of a permit from the Director of Public Safety by anyone
desiring, to hold a public meeting or demonstration.5 The
Committee for Industrial Organization was repeatedly denied
permission to hold meetings and its members were forcibly
prevented from distributing literature explaining worker's rights
under the National Labor Relations Act.90
Justice Butler, writing for the majority, held that the ordinance
was facially invalid because the Director of Public Safety had sole
discretion to refuse permrits. 7 Such unbridled discretion could not
be a substitute for the City's duty to maintain order in connection
with exercise of First Amendment privileges.9 8 Although the Court
88. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
89. Davis, 167 U.S. at 44-46.
90. Ild, at 47. Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that, in marked contrast to
modem First Amendment jurisprudence, *[f]or the legislature absolutely; or conditionally to
forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights
of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."
91. Id at48.
92. It appears that, during this intervening period, the Court was either not confronted
with this issue or elected not to address it.
93. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
94. Id, at 501-03.
95. Hague, 307 U.S. at 502-03. The ordinance authorized the Director of Public Safety
to refuse the permit "for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage." Id
96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994).




did not directly overrule Davis, it held that use of public fora for
the dissemination of thoughts and ideas was one of the privileges
and immunities guaranteed to citizens by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 Therefore, use of public streets and other facilities to
communicate ideas may not be abridged or denied under the guise
of regulation.100
Seven years later, in Marsh v. State of Alabama,1 1 the Court
addressed a similar issue: whether Alabama improperly convicted
Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, who attempted to distribute religious
literature on a sidewalk in Chickasaw, Alabama, violating a state
criminal statute that punished individuals who remained on
property after being asked to leave. 1°2 Unlike the public fora in
Hague, the sidewalk in Chickesaw was privately owned. 103 In its
reversal of Marsh's conviction, the Court held that although the
sidewalk was privately owned, the sidewalk's public nature
afforded Marsh a significant degree of First Amendment
freedoms.1°4 The Court reasoned that although title was vested in a
private corporation, the public nature of the forum required that
the balance between constitutionally guaranteed property rights
and constitutionally guaranteed free speech rights be tipped in
favor of the latter.0
In Saia v. People of State of New York,'06 the Court was
concerned with whether, under the First Amendment, a Lockport
ordinance prohibiting the use of loudspeakers in public violated the
defendant's right to free speech.1°7 The Lockport ordinance
prohibited the use of sound amplification devices in any building or
upon any vehicle where the sound was broadcast onto public
streets and places.108 The. ordinance provided, however, that an
99. Id. at 515-16. Justice Butler stated "[w]herever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions." Id,
100. I
101. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
102. Id at 503.
103. Id. at 502-03. Chickasaw was a suburb of the port city of Mobile, Alabama Id.
The entire town, including the sidewalk in question, was owned by Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation. Id, However, to all appearances, the town was merely a part of the larger city
of Mobile and no restrictions were placed on ingress or egress from the privately owned
areas. Id,
104. Mars4, 326 U.S. at 510.
105. Id.
106. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
107. Id. at 558.
108. Id,
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exception to the prohibition against the use of sound amplification
devices could be granted by the Chief of Police.1 9 Saia was a
Jehovah's Witness who obtained permission from the Chief of
Police to broadcast his lectures on religious subjects via
loudspeakers mounted on top of his car."0 Although Saia was
denied a renewal of his permit upon expiration, he nevertheless
continued to broadcast his messages."' The Court held that the
portion of the ordinance requiring approval from the Chief of
Police was facially invalid." 2 The authority of the Chief of Police to
approve or deny permits was unlimited." 3 The Court found that a
narrowly drawn statute may contain limitations on volume or the
hours during which speech may be broadcast, but may not permit
the exercise of unbridled discretion."4 The Lockport statute had no
such limitations, and was therefore, held to be narrowly drawn"
A year later, in Kovacs v. Cooper,"6 the Court upheld an
ordinance similar to that in Saia."7 In Kovacs, the court addressed
whether a Trenton, New Jersey ordinance prohibiting the use of
amplifiers that emitted a "loud or raucous noise" violated the
defendant's First Amendment right to free speech."8 Kovacs was
convicted of violating the ordinance when he used a "sound truck"
to make speeches on a public street near a municipal building."9
The Court upheld Kovacs' conviction, 120 noting that the ordinance
was merely designed to control the level of noise and contained no
provisions whereby city officials could use their discretion to
109. Id. at 558. Section three of the ordinance stated, in pertinent part "items of news
and matters of public concern and athletic activities shall not be deemed a violation of this
section provided that the same be done under permission obtained from the Chief of Police."
Id.
110. Saia, 334 U.S. at 559.
111. Id. There were apparently at least four violations of the ordinance. Id.
112. Id. at 559-60. Justice Douglas stated that the "ordinance is unconstitutional on its
face, for it establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech... and the statute is
not narrowly drawn to regulate the hours or places of use of loud-speakers, or the volume of
sound (the decibels) to which they must be adjusted." Id.
113. Id. at 560. The Court was most troubled by the fact that permits were granted or
denied at the discretion of the Lockport Chief of Police. Id. "The right to be heard is placed
in the uncontrolled discretion of the Chief of Police. He stands athwart the channels of
communication as an obstruction which can be removed only after a criminal trial and
conviction and lengthy appeal. A more effective previous restraint is difficult to imagine." Id.
114. Saia, 334 U.S. at 562.
115. Id. at 561-62.
116. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
117. Id,
118. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 78.
119. Id. at79.
120. Id. at 89.
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approve or disapprove particular uses of sound amplification
equipment.121 The Court stated that Kovacs was distinguishable
from Saia because the purpose of the Kovacs ordinance was
nuisance control, and the ordinance contained no element of
discretionary censorship like the ordinance in Saia.122 In his
dissent, Justice Black stated that the Trenton ordinance was not
narrowly tailored because the ordinance, as written, barred the use
of all sound amplification devices, but did not restrict the volume
or the hours during which such broadcasts could be made.'23
Therefore, Justice Black would have reversed the lower court's
judgment.
24
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Grayned v. City of
Rockford.125 In Grayned, the Court explored whether a Rockford,
Illinois ordinance that prohibited picketing within 150 feet of any
school, violated demonstrators' First Amendment right of free
speech. 26 Additionally, the ordinance prohibited making any noise
that might disrupt a school.127 The Court held that the prohibition
against picketing was unconstitutional, but the anti-noise provision
in the ordinance was constitutional. 28 Justice Marshall, writing for
the majority, articulated that narrowly tailored ordinances are
acceptable as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. m
Such restrictions, however, must support a significant government
interest.3° The significant government interest in Grayned was the
maintenance of order in school classrooms, as well as the State's
121. Id, at 82-83.
122. ld. The ordinance did not contain any provision comparable to section three of
the ordinance in Saia allowing the Chief of Police, at his discretion, to grant or deny
permits. I& See supra note 113.
123. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 104 (Black, J. dissenting). Justice Black found that an
ordinance that placed limits on the time or volume of broadcast messages would be valid. A
broad prohibition on the use any type of amplification would be unconstitutional, however.
Id,
124. Id.
125. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
126. Id at 107. The ordinance stated that "[a] person commits disorderly conduct
when he knowingly... [plickets or demonstrates ... within 150 feet of any . .. school
building while the school is in session ... provided that this subsection does not prohibit
the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute." Id.
127. Id. at 108. This section of the ordinance states that "[no person, while on public
or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a school . .. is in session, shall...
make ... any noise or diversion which disturbs . . . the peace and good order of such
school session...." Id.
128. Id. at 106.
129. Id. at 115.
130. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115.
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ability to provide an environment conducive to learning.131 The
ordinance met the requirement that it be narrowly tailored because
it punished only conduct that tended to interfere with school
functions.12
Four years later, the final part of the three-part test concerning
content neutral prohibitions against free speech was articulated in
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.m At issue in this case was a Virginia statute that
prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising their prices for
prescription drugs. The Virginia Citizens Consumer Council
attacked the statute on the grounds that it violated the pharmacists'
First Amendment right of free speech made applicable to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment.'3 The Court explored the
constitutionality of the statute, and citing the cases above, noted
that previous time, place, and manner restrictions had been upheld,
provided that they served a significant government interest and left
open alternative channels of communication.'- Thus, in addition to
being narrowly tailored, and serving a significant government
interest, content neutral restrictions must also allow alternative
channels of communication. 3 The Court, however, determined that
the Virginia statute was not content neutral, and struck down the
statute.1
37
The Court in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. added yet
another test for content neutral restrictions. 1 In Madsen, the Court
addressed whether an injunction against abortion protesters in
Melbourne, Florida violated the protesters' First Amendment right
of free speech.13 The petitioners challenged several provisions of
the injunction: a thirty-six-foot buffer zone around clinic property; a
restriction on noise levels; a restriction on observable images; a
300-foot "no approach zone" around clinic property, and a
prohibition against demonstrating within 300 feet of the residence
131. Id. at 119-20.
132. " Id
133. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Although Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy is most often
noted for its holding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, it also
clarified the test for content neutral restrictions on speech prior to Madsen. Id.
134. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749-50.
135. Id. at 771.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 771-73.
138. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
139. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757-58. After an earlier injunction failed to prevent abortion
protesters from blocidng access to clinics, the Court issued a more expansive injunction,
some of whose provisions were challenged. Id.
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of a clinic staff member.14°  Noting the differences between
injunctions and ordinances, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, held that the traditional test for content neutral
restrictions was not sufficiently strict regarding content neutral
injunctions. 141 The Madsen test for content neutral injunctions that
requires that a significant government interest be at stake and
examines whether the challenged portions of the injunction burden
more speech than necessary to serve that interest' The
governmental interests in Madsen included: protecting a woman's
constitutional right to have an abortion, preserving the public
peace, and ensuring the health and safety of clinic patients.'4
Applying this new test to the challenged provisions of the
injunction, the Court held that a thirty-six-foot buffer zone around
clinic property was acceptable because it appeared to be the only
reasonable means of ensuring access to clinic facilities. 44
Additionally, the anti-noise provision of the injunction burdened no
more speech than necessary because it was aimed at protecting the
health and safety of clinic patients.'45 The other challenged
provisions of the injunction, however, burdened more speech than
necessary.'4 Thus, Madsen announced a new test applicable to
prior restraints in the form of an injunction, as opposed to an
ordinance.1
47
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York represents
the Supreme Court's first attempt to put meat on the bones of
Madsen. Perhaps due to the divisiveness of the abortion issue,
however, the Court overlooked an important issue and incorrectly
applied the Madsen test to the challenged provisions in Schenck.
140. Id. at 759-61. The challenged provisions of the injunction included: (1) a
thirty-six-foot buffer zone around clinic property; (2) a prohibition on noise during surgical
procedures and recovery periods; and (3) a 300-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances and
residences of clinic employees. Id
141. The Court stated-
There are obvious differences, however, between an injunction and a generally
applicable ordinance. Ordinances represent a legislative choice regarding the
promotion of particular societal interests. Injunctions, by contrast, are remedies
imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree.
... Injunctions also carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application
than do general ordinances.
Id.
142. Id. at 765.
143. Id. at 767 68.
144. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768-71.
145. Id. at 772-73.
146. Id. at 776.
147. Id. at 765.
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In Madsen, for the first time, the Court correctly determined that
a different standard was required for content-neutral injunctions
than for content-neutral ordinances or statutes.148 The Court
acknowledged that there were certain advantages to injunctions
over generally applicable ordinances - particularly, the ability to
precisely tailor an injunction to prevent recurrence of specific
lawless conduct by named defendants. 49 This precise tailoring
feature should require a great deal of deference to be shown to the
trial judge.lw It appears, however, that the Schenck Court
overlooked or sidestepped District Judge Arcara's determination of
one important government interest involved in Schenck.
Prior to Madsen, an injunction was required to be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest and to maintain
alternate channels of communication.1 5' The district court identified
three significant government interests.'5 First, the government had
a significant interest in ensuring that abortions were performed
safely.'53 Second, the government was concerned with maintaining
access to the clinics.' 4 Finally, the government sought to ensure
that the constitutional rights of one group were not trampled in an
attempt to protect the rights of another group.' s
The Supreme Court, analyzing the Schenck injunction in light of
Madsen,1' also identified several significant government interests
identical to the interests at stake in Madsen. 57 These interests
included maintaining public order and safety, promoting free traffic
flow on public sidewalks and streets, protecting private property
rights, and ensuring access to clinics.'58
It appears that the Supreme Court's determination of the
148. Id. at 764-65. The Court noted that injunctions are issued absent any significant
degree of public debate and public participation in the political process. Id.
149. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
150. Id. at 769-70. Justice Rehnquist stated that "some deference must be given to the
state court's familiarity with the facts and the background of the dispute between the parties
even under our heightened review. Id. See also Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local
753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 294 (1941) (holding that "[tlo substitute our
judgment for that of the (trial court] is to transcend the limits of our authority"). Id.
151. Pro-Choice I, 799 E Supp. at 1432.




156. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 864. Madsen states that the test is "whether the challenged
provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant
government interest." Id.




government interests at stake was notably different from the
interests determined by the district court in issuing the injunction.
Specifically, the Supreme Court apparently did not consider the
safe performance of abortions to be a compelling government
interest 1W It is difficult to understand why promoting free traffic
flow, maintaining public order, and ensuring access to clinics
remain significant government interests while protecting the health
of those undergoing abortions is not. One explanation is that the
polemical nature of the abortion issue continues to be problematic
for the Court. Not prepared to directly overrule Roe v. Wade,160 the
Court instead has chosen to obliquely attack the matter of abortion
by indirect support of the right-to-life movement. In this case,
however, it appears that the Court has reached an anomalous
outcome as a result of this strategy.
The district court identified several very real health risks caused
by the defendant's activities.16' The stress caused by the actions of
the abortion protesters caused clinic patients to suffer elevated
blood pressure, hyperventilation, and severe anxiety that required
sedation, as well as psychological counseling, before the
procedure.'6 The presence of protesters often caused women to
delay abortions or forgo the procedure entirely. 63 Finally, the
activities of the protesters deterred patients from seeking necessary
follow-up care.164
It is undoubtedly the contentious nature of the abortion issue
that caused the Supreme Court to sidestep addressing the
government's interest in protecting the health of clinic patients.
Regardless of the Court's discomfort with the abortion issue, an
abortion is a legal medical procedure, and the courts also have a
duty to ensure that those seeking abortions are protected from the
actions of protesters that pose a very real threat to a patient's
health and safety. Until the Court is prepared to directly overrule
Roe, it must remember that duty and protect all patients seeking
159. 1& The Court briefly mentions medical 'well-being" in footnote 8. Chief Justice
Rehnquist claims, however, that because the anti-noise provisions in the Pro-Choice
injunction were not challenged, that potential government interest was not implicated. Id,
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. Pro-Choice I, 799 F Supp. at 1427.
162. Id These symptoms demonstrate increased stress that increases the risk
associated with surgery. Id,
163. Id. Such a delay may result in the procedure being performed in the second
trimester, as opposed to the first trimester, thus increasing the attendant risk Id.
164. Id.
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medical treatment, rather than nibbling around the edges of Roe, as
the Schenck decision does.
Michael L. Utz

